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In The Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
NATIONAL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, successor to CONTINENTAL 
REPUBLIC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff·Appe!lant, 
... 
vs. 
BAYOU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., a UtahllblW[ 
poration; FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CRf'nit' 
CO., a Utah corporation; WESTERN ACCEPT-
ANCE CORP., a Utah corporation, BRYCE f 
WADE; FAMILY BUILDING CREDITS CO., 
a Utah corporation; KEITH R. NELSON 
d/b/a A.A.A. ELECTRIC SERVICE; WA· 
SATCH PLUMBING SUPPLY CO., a Utah 
corporation; STANDARD BUILDERS SUP-
PLY COM., INC., a Utah corporation; S. F. 
FREDRICKSON & MRS. PAUL H.- HUPP 
d/b/a HUPP REFRIGERATION COMPANY, 
formerly known as PAUL H. HUPP COM-
PANY; LA MAR KAY d/b/a QUALITY 
ELECTRIC MOTOR REP AIRS; EDDIE A. 
BUTTERFIELD d/b/a COOK, INC.; ROBI· 
SON DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah corporation; WETHERBEE FIXTURE 
CO., WILLIAMS BUILDING SUPPLY COM· 
PANY. a Utah corporation; CLYDE V. BUX-
TON d/b/a BUXTON HEATING & AIR 
CONDITIONING; TOWN & COUNTRY IN-
TERIORS; STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH; ELDRID S. BUNT-
ING djbja SCHOPPE SHEET METAL COM-
PANY; INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH; NEELEY, INC., a 
Utah corporation; INTERMOUNTAIN ASSO-
CIATION OF CREDIT MEN, a Utah corpo-
RATION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 
any and all other persons or corporations 
claiming any right, title, or interest in or to 
the property as in this Complaint described, 
said parties being unknown to plaintiff, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
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Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court 
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Merrill C. Faux, Judge 
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The Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
NATIONAL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, successor to CONTINENTAL 
REPUBLIC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
BAYOU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., a Utah cor-
poration; FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT 
CO., a Utah corporation; WESTERN ACCEPT-
ANCE CORP., a Utah corporation, BRYCE 
WADE; FAMILY BUILDING CREDITS CO., 
a Utah corporation; KEITH R. NELSON 
d/b/a A.A.A. ELECTRIC SERVICE; W A-
SATCH PLUMBING SUPPLY CO., a Utah 
corporation; STANDARD BUILDERS SUP-
PLY COM., INC., a Utah corporation; S. F. 
FREDRICKSON & MRS. PAUL H. HUPP 
d/b/a HUPP REFRIGERATION COMPANY, 
formerly known as PAUL H. HUPP COM-
PANY; LA MAR KAY d/b/a QUALITY 
ELECTRIC MOTOR REPAIRS; EDDIE A. 
BUTTERFIELD d/b/a COOK, INC.; ROBI-
SON DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah corporation; WETHERBEE FIXTURE 
CO., WILLIAMS BUILDING SUPPLY COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation; CLYDE V. BUX-
TON djb/a BUXTON HEATING & AIR 
CONDITIONING; TOWN & COUNTRY IN-
TERIORS: STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH; ELDRID S. BUNT-
ING d/b/a SCHOPPE SHEET METAL COM-
PANY; INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH; NEELEY, INC., a 
Utah corporation; INTERMOUNTAIN ASSO-
CIATION OF CREDIT MEN, a Utah corpo-
RATION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA· 
any and all other persons or corporation~ 
claiming any right, title, or interest in or to 
the property as in this Complaint described 
said parties being unknown to plaintiff, ' 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF TI-IE 
CASE 
In an action to foreclose a mortgage on a country 
club, defendant-respondent, Bayou Country Club, In-
corporated, counterclaimed asserting the loan was usuri-
ous and cia iming forfeiture of unpaid interest, treble 
the amount of $14,500.00 paid by defendant to plaintiff 
in consideration of a $65,000.00 first mortgage loan; 
treble the amount of $2,630.27 which had been allocated 
to interest by plaintiff; and an attorney's fee. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At pretrial, Honorable Stewart M. Hanson ruled 
that as a matter of law plaintiff, Continental Republic 
Life Insurance Company, had violated the usury 
laws of Utah and that in consequence of said violation 
the interest on plaintiff's note was forfeited; that the 
$14,500.00 paid to plaintiff by defendant be trebled; 
that the $2,630.27 allocated by plaintiff to interest on 
the monthly payments paid by defendant be trebled. 
At trial, Honorable Merrill C. Faux, after review-
ing all previous orders, depositions and briefs, ruled 
by way of judgment that as a matter of law plaintiff 
had violated the usury laws of Utah; that defendant 
had paid plaintiff for making the loan the sum of $14,-
500.00 and had paid additional interest of $2,630.27, 
both of which sums were allowed to be trebled; that 
plaintiff should be awarded judgment for the sum of 
$65,293.81, together with an attorney's fee of $6,000.00 
6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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and costs~ nnd that defendant should be granted judg-
ment for *;; 1,390.81, together with an attorney's fee 
in the sum of $5,000.00. Plaintiff, after offsetting de-
t'twlant's judgment, would receive $14,903.00, which 
sum included the $6,000.00 attorney's fee. 
ltELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to have the lower court's judg-
nwnt of 1\Iarch 31, 1964, affirmed in regard to defend-
ant-respondent's counterclaim. Defendant further 
seeks to haYe the $6,000.00 attorney's fee awarded to 
plaintiff disallowed, or in the alternative, to have the 
attorney's fee reduced commensurate with plaintiff's 
recovery after offsetting defendant's counterclaim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant does not agree with the Statement 
ot' Facts as set forth in plaintiff's brief. 
At all times during the course of the litigation in 
the lower court, counsel for plaintiff admitted that the 
s1nn of $15,000.00 had been received by plaintiff in 
consideration for making the loan. Defendant, during 
the course of hearings, stipulated that $500.00 of the 
~15,000.00 had been used for an insurance policy on the 
life of the president of defendant, George Padjen. It 
was further stipulated by plaintiff and defendant that 
$2,630.:?i was the correct sum which plaintiff had 
charged to interest, calculated on the basis of nine per 
rent ( 9r-c) per annum on the sum of $65,000.00. 
7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiff commenced an action against defendant 
for the sum of $65,298.77, interest and attorney's fees 
(R. 1, 5). 
Defendant did not at any time have knowledge that 
Frank A. Nelson Jr. was to receive any part of the 
$15,000.00. (R. 450, p. 14, 25). Frank A. Nelson Jr., 
upon instructions from plaintiff, and as an agent of 
plaintiff, procured from McGhie Abstract Company a 
check in the sum of $15,000.00. (R. 448, Exhibit "J". 
R. 450, p. 16, 17, 20). Frank A. Nelson Jr. then re-
turned to his bank, and upon the instructions of Marvin 
Bainum, president of Continental Republic Life In-
surance Company, deposited the check (R. 450, Exhibit 
"C") . The sum of $12,500.00 was deposited to the 
account of plaintiff. (R. 450, Exhibits "E", "F"). The 
sum of $2,000.00 was deposited to the account of Frank 
A. Nelson Jr. (R. 450, Exhibit "C" and Exhibit "G"). 
The remaining $500.00 was remitted to plaintiff for a 
premium on a life insurance policy on the life of George 
Padjen, president of defendant (R. 450, Exhibit "C"). 
Frank A. Nelson Jr. was informed by plaintiff to 
procure the $15,000.00 from defendant at the time the 
loan was closed (R. 450, p. 17, 30). Defendant had 
orally promised Frank A. Nelson Jr. the sum of 
$1,000.00 for his services, which sum was to be paid at 
a later date (R. 450, p. 14). 
Although Honorable Stewart M. Hanson ruled at 
pretrial on certain segments of the case, Honorable 
Merrill C. Faux at a hearing held February 13, 1964, 
8 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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stated thut sill('<: it was incumbent on him to sign the 
tinnl judgment he would examine the entire record, in-
dwling- depositions. Thereafter, on ~larch 31, 196~, 
after l'onduding the record warranted the judgment, 
the Honorable -~\lerrill C. Faux signed the final judg-
ment (It 280). 
ST ... \TEl\IENT OF POINTS AND 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TilE LO\VER COURT PROPERLY RULED 
TIL\T AS .A 1\l.ATTER OF"' LAW THE LOAN 
\\'AS lTSURIOUS. 
The pretrial judge, Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, 
and the trial judge, Merrill C. Faux, each ruled as a 
matter of law the loan was usurious. 
Plaintiff at no time denied that they had not de-
manded and received the $14,500.00 as a consideration 
for tnaking the loan to defendant. The note on its face 
showed an interest charge of nine per cent ( 9<fo) per 
nmnun on the sum of $65,000.00. From this, it is a 
simple calculation to show that plaintiff was receiving 
far in excess of the ten per cent ( IO<fo) allowed by Sec-
tion 15-1-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The $1-J..:HW.OO paid by defendant to plaintiff was 
:?:?.31 per cent of the entire loan. 
It is the agreement to exact and pay usurious in-
terest and not the performance of the agreement which 
renders it usurious. 
9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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"The test to be applied in any given case is 
whether the contract, if performed according to 
its terms, would result in producing to the lender 
a rate of interest greater than is allowed by law." 
Seebold v. Eustermann~ 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W. 
2d 739. Annotated in 152 ALR 585. 
"Since the usurious character of a transaction 
is determined as of the date of its inception, if a 
contract is usurious in its inception, no subsequent 
transaction will cure it." Gaitler v. Farmers & 
M. Bank~ 7 L. Ed. 43. 
Although a note was executed and cancelled in the 
amount of $15,000.00, this was done only as a subterfuge 
to obtain the $15~000.00 from the McGhie Abstract 
Company. 
"A court will look to the substance of every 
transaction as to which usury. is pleaded, and if 
the lender is securing a greater benefit than that 
provided by law by any kind of a device, the 
. contract will be held usurious, although it is 
cloaked under the guise of a commission, bonus 
or other name." Wallace v. Zinman~ 200 Cal. 
585, 245 P. 964. See also Haines v. Commercial 
Mortgage Co.~ 200 Cal. 609, 254 P. 956, and 55 
Am. Jur., Usury Section 14. 
"A note is to be tested for usury with refer-
ence to the actual sum received by the borrower 
and not by the face amount of the note." Taylor 
v. Budd~ 217 Cal. 262, 18 P. 2d 333. 
"In testing for a usurious exaction, a fee or 
bonus beyond the legal rate of interest consti-
tutes an additional charge for interest." Haines 
v. Commercial Mortgage Co.~ Supra. See also 
10 
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'ftlurph.t! v. J-Vilson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 132, 31~ 
P. ~d 507. 
Defendunt cannot be estopped from defending on 
the grounds that usury has been perpetrated as the 
demand for the payn1ent of $14,500.00 was made by 
plaintiff and it is irrational to conceive that a borrower 
would conspire to create a usurious loan when the need 
for 1noney to protect a borrower's security is so great 
that each dollar becomes the difference between success 
and failure. 
"ln view of the purpose of the usury statute 
to protect necessitous and needy borrowers from 
the oppression of lenders, it is unanimously held 
that the borrower is not particeps criminis with 
the lender in the usurious transaction, the lender 
alone being the violator of the law." Seebold v. 
Eustermann, Supra. See also 55 Am. Jur., 
Usury, Section 101. 
Plaintiff as a proposition that a payment to Frank 
...-\. Nelson Jr. by defendant was not usurious because 
the defendant received full value, sets forth the case of 
.~.llortgage Bond Company v. Stephens~ 181 Okla. 182, 
i2 P. 2d 831, in which case the court stated: 
"No additional burden was placed on borrower 
as the commission paid in the amount of $400.00 
on a $10,000.00 loan was not in consideration 
for making said loan, as an agreement had been 
preYiously entered into by which the $400.00 
was to be paid to the agent." See also Pushee v. 
Johnson, 1:23 Fla. 305, 166 S. 847. 
This was not true in regard to the defendant, as de-
11 
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fendant had promised Frank A. Nelson Jr. $1,000.00, 
which was to be paid at a later date, and the $14,500.00 
demanded and paid to plaintiff was a condition of and 
in consideration of making the loan, and defendant had 
no knowledge that Frank A. Nelson Jr. was to receive 
any of said sum (R. 450, p. 14, 25). 
It seems to be unanimously held that the require-
ment that the borrower pay a commission to the inter-
mediary through whom the loan was actually or ap-
parently negotiated will be held to constitute usury if 
the court can see that the payment in excess of the 
lawful interest was really exacted as a consideration 
for the loan and not as compensation for the services 
of the intermediary to the borrower. Tompkins v. 
Vaught~ 138 Ark. 262, 211 S.W. 361. See also Dickey 
v.Phoenix Finance Co.~ 193Ark. 1145, 104 S.W.2d 806; 
Addeson v. B. F. Dittmar Co.~ 124 Tex. 564, 80 S.W. 
2d 939. Annat ated in 52 ALR 2d 703. 
And in a recent Washington case, Ostigui v. A. F. 
Frank Construction Company~ 55 Wash. 2d 350, 347, 
P. 2d 1049, in which the borrower was required as a 
consideration of a loan of $10,000.00 to pay $2,000.00 
to an attorney, even where it could not be shown that 
the lender received the $2.000.00, the court reasoned 
that even if there is no evidence that lender benefited 
or received any portion of the $2,000.00 paid to the 
attorney, it does not relieve lender of the charge of 
usury. 
Plaintiff contends that the depositions of Frank 
12 
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A. X elson .Jr. are not part of the record. However, all 
depositions including two (2} depositions of Frank A. 
:-\ elson Jr. were published by the Honorable Stewart 
:\1. II anson at pretrial (R. 202). 
POINT 2 
1·~\ Y~IENTS ~IAY NOT BE ALLOCATED 
TO PRINCIPAL TO MAKE INVALID THE 
PENALTY CLAUSE OF THE USURY STAT-
UTE. 
If we use plaintiff's line of argument, the penalty 
provisions of Section 15-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, would never be allowed or applicable, 
as it provides therein: 
"In case the greater rate of interest has been 
paid, the person by whom it has been paid, or his 
legal representatives, may recover back three 
times the amount of the interest thus paid from 
the receiver or taker thereof, and reasonable at-
torney's fees, provided that such action is com-
menced within two ( 2) years from the time the 
usurious transaction occurred.'' 
The action by such statute must be commenced within 
two (:?) years from the time the usurious transaction 
occurred, and if we use the facts of this case as an 
example, the principal sum would not be paid for fifteen 
(15) years, and by the payment schedule, the $65,-
000.00, taking all payments and applying to principal 
only and not to interest, would not be paid for over 
eight ( 8) years, which would then allow plaintiff to 
13 
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plead the statute of limitation as provided in such 
statute. This would always allow an unscrupulous 
lender on long term loans a defense to the penalty pro-
vision, as if the action were commenced within the two 
( 2) year statute of limitations he could defend on the 
ground that all payments are allocated to principal, 
and if a borrower waited until the principal was paid, 
the lender would defend on the statute of limitations. 
This was not the intent of the legislature, as Section 
15-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, spe-
cifically provides: "In case the greater rate of interest 
has been paid", which does not require the principal 
to have been paid in full. The plaintiff took the $14,-
500.00 as consideration for making the loan and said 
sum can only be considered as additional interest as 
the sum was never credited to defendant as principal, 
as the sum of $65,000.00 has been claimed by plaintiff 
at all times in these proceedings. Further, the $2,630.27 
was charged on plaintiff's books as interest, and not 
allocated to principal. 
This principle was applied in the case of Goodwin 
v. Alston_, 130 Cal. App. 2d 664, 280 P. 2d 34, in which 
the borrower was required as a consideration for a loan 
of $70,000.00 to give lender 4,000 sacks of potatoes, 
which the lender sold for $15,958.00, and in said case 
the lender contended that, assuming that all payments 
were made by borrower, they should have been allocated 
to principal, leaving no basis for a penalty for treble 
the amount paid. It was argued by lender that neither 
the $15,958.00, the proceeds from the 4,000 sacks of 
14 
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potatoes, nor the su1n of $673.33, which was paid as 
interest, the mnounts which were trebled by the court, 
were allocated as interest by any of the parties to the 
transaction, and that since there was no legal obligation 
here, these mnounts should have been allocated to prin-
cipal. Thet·e was evidence that the amount of $673.33 
was allocated to interest by the lender himself when 
the payments were received. The California court on 
these facts ruled: 
"With respect to the proceeds from the 4,000 
sacks of potatoes, they were demanded by lender 
and received by him purely as a bonus for the 
nutking of the loan, and without which the loan 
would not have been made. As such a bonus, it 
con1es within the provisions of the usury law, and 
was properly regarded as interest collected in 
violation of that law. While this was an unprofit-
able deal for the lender and the penalties were 
harsh, he entered into these transactions for the 
purpose of taking profit not permitted by the 
statute, and is subject to such penalties as are 
properly applicable." See also Brocke v. N aseath 
134 Cal. A.pp. 2d 23, 285 P. 2d 291 
Further, in Home Savings & Loan A.ssn. v. Sani-
tary Fish Co., 156 Wash. 80,286 P. 76, in which $500.00 
had been added to a $3,000.00 note as a bonus, and the 
lender defended on on the grounds that said $500.00 
bonus should be deducted from principal, the court 
reasoned as follows: 
·· .... -\. usuror could escape any severe penalty for 
the most outrageous usury by including usurious 
interest in the nominal principal of the note. For 
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example ,a loan of $3,000.00 could be made, for 
which the lender takes a note for twice that 
amount, or $6,000.00, payable in one ( 1) year, 
without interest, if the law be construed in ac-
cordance with the contention of the lender in a 
suit from this note, in which the grossly usurious 
nature of the transaction should be established, 
the lender would nevertheless recover judgment 
for his $3,000.00, since the lender could defend 
on the ground that the $3,000.00 should be de-
ducted from principal and he should have judg-
ment for the $3,000.00 actually due him. In such 
a case, the usuror would run less risk by exacting 
an obligation for twice or more of the amount of 
the actual principal of his loan for the use of the 
money than he would run if he required interest 
at the rate of thirteen per cent (13o/o) per annum 
for the use thereof." 
In an 1894 case which plaintiff relies upon, McBroom 
v. Scottish Mortgage & Land Investment Company, 
153 ·u.S. 318, 38 L. Ed. 729, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 852, 
the United States Supreme Court was interpreting a 
statute in New Mexico, and the court stated that as 
the statute only imposes a fine and penalty they would 
not add a penalty not prescribed by the statute, and 
that a penalty can only be that which a statute pre-
sc:Pibes, and the court made the following statement: 
"No question is presented in the case before us 
as to whether the borrower when sued for the 
principal debt and legal interest may of right 
set off the amount of any penalty prescribed by 
the statute of New Mexico." 
Further, plaintiff uses for authority a recent case, 
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Hukarina v . .Accounts Supervision Corporation, 241 
~L:\ 195, i:J7 S.\V. 2d 503, a ~Iissouri case, which did 
not allow the recovery of interest paid, but the .Niissouri 
statute in regard to usury is not similar to Utah's statute 
on usury. as in Section 3229 of R.S. Missouri 1939, 
ItS. 1949, Para. 408.050, recovery may only be had for 
usums of money paid in excess of the principal 
and legal rate of interest." 
POINT 3 
TilE PAYMENT OF $14,500.00 IN CON-
SIDERATION FOR A LOAN IS SUBJECT TO 
BEING TREBLED. 
Plaintiff is inconsistent in its argument, on one 
hand saying the $14,500.00 was paid to Frank A. Nelson 
Jr. and paid by Nelson to plaintiff, and in the next 
argument saying the $14,500.00 was a discount taken 
by plaintiff and does not comply with the statute as 
interest paid. This was a commission or bonus paid by 
defendant. It would not change the result if defendant 
had used other money of its own to pay plaintiff the 
usurious bonus, as when the loan was executed the 
$14,500.00 became money which was then the personal 
property of defendant. 
Defendant received the sum of $65,000.00 on which 
interest was provided at nine per cent (97o) per annum, 
and when payments were made, plaintiff charged in-
terest on the entire $65,000.00. The $14,500.00 received 
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by plaintiff was additional interest or profit in con-
sideration for making the loan, and would by necessity 
in general accounting principles be additional interest 
and reported as income for the year in which the $14,-
500.00 was received, as plaintiff on its books showed a 
loan of $65,000.00 on which it was charging nine per 
cent ( 9<j1o) interest per annum and by the terms of said 
note would receive the full principal in the amount of 
$65,000.00 plus interest. 
Plaintiff states that if defendant received the 
$14,500.00 and paid it back, there would be no discount, 
and therefore no usury at all. This is fallacious reasoning 
in that if defendant had not been required to pay plain-
tiff the $14,500.00, this sum would have been available 
to operate its busines, and to pay other creditors. If 
it was not paid by defendant, where did the $14,500.00 
come from? At all times plaintiff acknowledged the re-
ceipt of the $14,500.00 as a bonus in consideration for 
making the loan. Plaintiff at no time expected to receive 
the $14,500.00 as a discount over the period of fifteen 
years, but received said sum in advance as a payment 
from defendant. 
In Smith v. Cavagliero Mortgage Company, Ill 
Cal. App. 136, 295 P. 366, the borrower received $105,-
000.00 and signed a note for $110,000.00, and the court 
reasoned that lender's exaction of a bonus represented 
by a note for an amount greater than the amount of 
the loan, alth<;.pgh usurious, is not payment of usurious 
interest, which under the statute is prerequisite to the 
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penulty. The court's decision was based on whether the 
borrower received the 1noney first and then paid smnc 
to lender. and the court further stated: 
''The debt is regarded as paid by the debtor 
if it is paid by a third person in accordance with 
au agree1uent between such third person and the 
debtor." 
Advance interest or bonus paid by defendant is 
subject to being trebled under Utah statute 15-1-7, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
POINT 4 
THE USURY LA"\VS OF UTAH ARE CON-
STITUTIONAL. 
The cases as set forth in plaintiff's brief are in 
the whole cases questioning the constitutionality of 
special laws as exclusions to the general usury laws. The 
plaintiff in his brief sets forth no cases which have spe-
cifically declared the general laws of usury to be un-
constitutional. 
It is a basic principle of constitutional law that 
where the Yalidity of a statute is assailed and there are 
two possible interpretations, by one of which the statute 
would be unconstitutional, and by the other it would be 
valid, the court should adopt the construction which 
would uphold it. 
"It is the duty of the courts to adopt all con-
struction of a statute that will bring it into har-
mony with the constitution if its language will 
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permit." Salter v. Nelson~ 85 Utah 460, 39 P. 2d 
1061. See also 11 Am. J ur., Constitutional Law, 
Section 97. 
Plaintiff alleges that the laws of usury in Utah 
which allow certain exceptions to the usury law would 
make the entire usury law unconstitutional, under 
Article 1, Section 24, of the Utah Constitution, "All 
laws of a general nature have uniform operation." 
In the case of Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Com-
pany, 12 Utah, 2d 357, 366 P. 2d 974, as quoted in 
plaintiff's brief, Judge Crockett, in a concurring opin-
ion, made the following statement: 
"I agree that a statute such as the one under 
consideration, which attempts to include some 
and exclude others, is unjustly discriminatory, 
unless the exclusions are on the basis of uniform 
classification so that all who fall within the same 
class are affected alike and the classification bears 
some reasonable relationship to the objectives 
sought to be accomplished by the statute." 
In our present usury laws which allow exclusions 
to various money lenders such as small loan companies, 
credit unions, banks and savings and loan companies, 
etc., there are special laws which control each of these 
classifications. All classifications are treated alike and 
are subject to regulation and licensing by the State of 
Utah. There is no discrimination as to classes within 
the exclusions and the legislature by their prerogative 
found valid reasons why these segments should be ex-
cluded from the general usury law. 
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In the case of Acme Finance Company v. Huse, 
lU:l \Vasl1. 96, 73 }>. 2<1 341, the 'Vashington Supreme 
Court was not considering a case on the usury laws of 
\Vashington, which has stood unassailed for many years. 
This particular case had to do with criminal law, which 
made it u tnisdetneanor for certain individuals to charge 
more than twelve per cent on loans less than $300.00. 
Part of this law had been vetoed and what was left of 
the law had so many exceptions as to who could legally 
charge Inore than twelve per cent without being guilty 
of a misdetneanor, it was found to be a special law with-
out reasonable classification. 
Further, in theN ebraska case of Stanton v. Mattson, 
175 Nebr. 767, 123 N.W. 2d 844, the Nebraska court 
found a law which authorized a time price differential 
for a motor vehicle or other goods sold under retail 
instalhnent contract to be allowed a certain rate of 
interest as unconstitutional. However, in further state-
ments. the court stated: 
"The legislature may make reasonable classi-
fications of persons, corporations and property 
for the purpose of legislation concerning them, 
but classification must rest upon real difference 
in situation and circumstance surrounding mem-
bers of class relative to subject of legislation, 
rendering appropriate its enactment, and, to be 
valid, law must operate uniformly and alike upon 
every member of class so designated." 
In the aboYe case, the usury laws of Nebraska were 
not attacked, but was based on class legislation as an 
exception to usury statute. 
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The rule applicable to the validity of usury statutes 
is stated in 55 Am. Jur., Usury Section 4, as follows: 
"The power of the legislature to regulate the 
rate of interest receivable for the use of money 
has been exercised from an early period in the 
history of this country. Usury statutes are con-
sidered valid police regulations for the protection 
of borrowers whose necessities often place them 
at the mercy of the Jender. The legislature is con-
sidered as having very broad powers in regard 
to this matter and enactments fixing maximum 
rates of interest generally will not be held invalid 
as class legislation if it is possible to avoid such 
a conclusion." See also Straus v. Elless Com-
pany, 245 Mich. 558, 222 N.W. 752. 
Further, in 12 Am. J ur., Constitutional Law, Sec-
tion 506, the following rule is set forth: 
''It is a recognized right of the legislature 
with respect to the rna tter of usury to deal with 
different classes of money lenders and money 
borrowers in different ways, provided there is 
nQ.thing apparently unreasonable in creating 
such distinctions and all members of each class 
are treated alike." See also Norris v. Lincoln, 
93 Neb. 658, 142 N.W. 114. 
In Carozza v. Federal Finance and Credit Company} 
149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332, corporations were excluded 
from protection from the usury statute, and the court 
stated as follows: 
"The only restriction on power of legislature 
to suspend operation of general law is that it 
must result in a suspension which is uniform both 
in privileges confirmed and liabilities imposed, 
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and which shall not be an arbitrary classifica-
tion.'' 
In plaintiff's brief, cases from Kentucky and Ten-
nt'ssee are set forth as authority for the proposition: 
"In all cases where general law can be applic-
able, no special law shall be enacted." Article 
VI. Section 26, Utah Constitution. 
The cnses all have to do with an attack on special statutes 
which were exceptions to usury laws in those states and 
the special laws were found to be unconstitutional and 
not the general usury statutes. 
"There is no nation known to history with any 
considerable financial or commercial structure 
which has not had laws against usury. Indeed, 
it has always been recognized that in the power 
of the lender to relieve _the wants of the borrower 
lies the germ of oppression." Malmud v. Black-
man, '251 App. Div. 192, 295 N.Y.S. 398, 16 
N.E. 2d 391. 
"Although usury laws may be and often are 
harsh in their language and effect, yet insofar as 
they establish a legislative policy the courts must 
apply and enforce them; a court does its full 
duty when it carefully inquires whether there is 
a violation of the law, and, if there is, gives to it 
the effect prescribed by the legislature." Seebold 
tw. Eustermann, Supra. 
On the question of morality, this particular case 
and the facts thereof become a prime example of why 
usury laws are a necessity and morally and legally 
sound. The plaintiff in this instance demanded as con-
sideration for a $65,000.00 loan the sum of $14,500.00, 
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a payment of 22.31 per cent, almost one-fourth of the 
entire loan, and, in addition thereto, charged the sum 
of nine per cent (9<fo) interest on the total $65,000.00 
loan. Morally, how far can a lender go when he realizes 
the financial necessities of a borrower? 
The Utah Supreme Court, although not directly 
considering the question set forth herein, in the case 
of Seaboard Finance Company v. Wahlen~ 123 Utah, 
529, 260 P. 2d 566, stated very clearly their opinion in 
this matter. 
Mr. Justice Crockett in the majority opinion in 
that case said: 
"It is the prerogative of the legislature and 
not of the courts to prescribe the rules as to 
usury. It is our function to interpret and apply, 
but not to question the wisdom of legislation. We 
can with judicial propriety call attention to situ-
ations which may appear to them to be unreason-
able, inconsistent or undesirable, so that due con-
sideration may be given thereto and a remedy 
provided, if deemed advisable by that body." 
Mr. Justice Wolfe in a concurring opinion in the 
above entitled case said: 
"The plaintiff, as well as other finance com-
panies licensed and regulated by the State, is 
engaged in a legitimate and necessary business. 
While the interest which it charged the defend-
ants may on the surface seem high, it was clearly 
within the charge permitted by statute. The legis-
lature took into consideration these factors when 
it established the maximum rates. Long before 
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renu:dialloan statutes were passed in Utah, more 
than one legislature had before it the data as to 
the cost of investigating and losses sustained by 
cotnpanies engaged in carrying on the s1nallloan 
business in the various levels of capital employed 
without the security of chattels or real estate, but 
on the security of personal sureties only. Know-
ing nothing of the earnings of the plaintiff or 
other finance companies, I cannot say that their 
charges are 'unconscionable', nor do I think their 
conduct can be properly classified as a 'scheme'." 
1\Ir. Justice McDonough concurred in the above 
observation of Mr. Justice Wolfe. 
1\lr. Justice Wade in an concurring opinion in the 
ahm·e entitled case said: 
"About the only benefit that can result from 
this litigation is that certain vicious results from 
the statutes on usury may be pointed out to the 
legislature for consideration in the future." 
Utah usury statutes are constitutional as it is the 
right of the legislature with respect to the· matter of 
usury to deal with different classes of money lenders 
in different ways, provided all members of each class 
are treated alike. 
POINT 5 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY FEE SHOULD 
BE DISALLOWED, OR IN THE ALTERNA-
TIVE. REDUCED COMMENSURATE WITH 
ITS RECOVERY. 
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Plaintiff argues that defendant's attorney fee is 
partly based on the amount of recovery and yet off-
setting defendant's judgment plaintiff would receive 
only $8,903.00 and plaintiff was allowed a $6,000.00 
attorney fee. 
In Land Mortgage Investment and Agency Corn-
pany of America v. Gillarn et at 49 So. C. 345, 26 S.E. 
990, the court stated: 
"The intention of our usury statute is to allow 
the plaintiff to recover only the sum advanced 
less penal ties on counterclaim ; and to allow an 
attorney's fee for foreclosure would be to add 
to the statute." ' 
And in Glenn v. Lavendar et al_, Texas Civ. App. 130 
S.W. 2d 391, in which case the lender was claiming 
attorney's fees of ten per cent (10ifo) on the total 
amount of certain notes, the Texas Supreme Court 
allowed lender's attorney a ten per cent (10ifo) attor-
ney's fee on difference between claim of lender and 
offset of borrower on usury claim. And further, in 
Ceraols v. Smith_, 112 Fla. 399, 150 So. 611, the court 
allowed a penalty offset of $3,000.00 to be deducted 
from an original loan of $4,500.00, and therein the 
court stated : 
"The amount allowed lender for attorney's fees 
should have appropriate relation to amount re-
covered." 
In Washington and many other states which pro-
vide that the lender may only recover the principal 
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amount of his claim less any penalty offsets, the courts 
hu,·c ruled that the lender may not recover any attor-
nl'y's fee. In smne of the states with statutes similar 
to Utah such as Florida and Texas, the courts have 
allowed lender attorney's fees based on the amount 
of recovery and not on the original amount of the mort-
gage or note. 
If we take an example wherein a lender is claim-
ing $5,000.00 plus attorney's fees and if there are pen-
alty offsets provided by the usury statute which would 
eliminate entirely the $5,000.00 claim by the lender, 
it would not seem logical or reasonable to allow lender 
an attorney's fee on the $5,000.00 or any attorney's fee 
at all because he recovers nothing. Maxwell v. Smith, 
119 Fla. 389, 161 So. 566. 
By the testimony of plaintiff's attorneys (R. 420}, 
approximately 197 hours of the 328 hours spent on the 
case were spent in the defense of the usury action, and 
it would be i1nproper for plaintiff's attorneys to be 
allowed attorney's fees for this defense on their fore-
dosure action. The attorney fees granted to plaintiff's 
attorneys should be based entirely upon time spent on 
the foreclosure action, taking into consideration the 
amount recovered of $8,903.00. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no issue of fact as plaintiff did not deny, 
and in fact admitted that the $14,500.00 was received 
in consideration for making a $65,000.00 first mortgage 
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loan, and further admitted that the $2,630.27 addi-
tional interest had been charged as interest by their own 
calculations (Point 1). 
Furthermore, if payments were allowed to be allotted 
to the reduction of principal, the penalty clause of the 
usury statute would become inoperable, as any un-
scrupulous lender would always have a defense as to 
the penalty (Point 2). 
Furthermore, the payment of $14,500.00 in con-
sideration for a loan is subject to being trebled because 
it is an additional payment of interest under the Utah 
usury statute (Point 3) . 
Furthermore, the usury statutes are constitutional 
because the legislature has the sole responsibility in this 
field and because there are no discriminations as to 
classes within the exclusions and the legislature found 
valid reasons why certain lending institutions should 
be excluded from the general usuary statutes (Point 4). 
Furthermore, plaintiff's attorney fee should be 
disallowed or reduced as the attorney fee awarded was 
based on time expended by plaintiff's attorneys, most 
of which time was spent in the defense of the usury 
counterclaim, and if any attorney fee is granted it 
should be based upon the amount of recovery (Point 5). 
Respectfully submitted, 
Nolan J. Olsen 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Bayou Country Club Incorporated 
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